

## **Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria, Efforts and Inhibitors: The Boko Haram Example, 2000-2020**

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**ABSTRACT:** *The paper broadly examined counter-insurgency, and narrowed it down to counter-terrorism efforts and inhibitors using Nigeria and the Boko Haram sect as the core study area and subject, respectively. It sought to integrate and synchronize the political, security, economic and informational components as veritable factors in countering subversion and violence of all sorts by sects. Agreeing that government must seize initiative, have overall plan, clear political aim, act in accordance with the dictates of the law, and give priority to defeating political subversion, all efforts, so far, geared towards defeating Boko Haram in Nigeria did not yield results. The paper concluded that all military and non-military measures were undermined by poor inter-agency cooperation and coordination; poor inter-agency intelligence information management; poor civil-military relations; and funding constraints and corruption in Defense Budgetary processes and arms procurement. The paper was written with primary documents and commentaries. Secondary sources served complementary purposes.*

**KEYWORDS:** Counter-terrorism, insurgency, military, intelligence, information and corruption

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## INTRODUCTION

### Conceptual Clarification

The focus of this paper is on counter-terrorism but would conceptualize at the introductory stage the gamut of insurgency bearing in mind of the species of violent activities spread across the Nigerian landscape. Counter-insurgency has been defined as the comprehensive civilian and military efforts undertaken to address the root causes of all forms of violent activities, namely, terrorism, militancy, religious schism, and the latest genre of banditry referred to as unknown gunmen and herdsmen in Nigeria. These are all organized actions of sects that use subversion and violence to challenge the political control of a region, create uncertainty and inflict mayhem. It must be borne in mind that terrorism is insurgency, and the two concepts will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing.

Initially, the Kanuri of northeast Nigeria misperceived the Boko Haram sect as a liberation force against Fulani hegemony. Broadly, it seemed to the Kanuri as a fight between the Old Sokoto Caliphate and the defunct Borno Caliphate. It has dawned on both the Kanuri and Fulani that the Boko Haram sect is not their representative, in spite of what the sect would have told them from the outset as being reasons for their actions. The most important thing, therefore, is the best approach that could be adopted in the fight against the sect.

Commentators are of the opinion that governments in counter-insurgency efforts must simultaneously, especially in using the military option, protect the population from violence; emphasize its legitimacy and capacity as a responsible government. It must isolate the insurgents politically, socially and economically, so that the actual purpose of the Boko Haram terrorists are laid bare. This is against the background that terrorists capitalize on societal problems, often called gaps; which they have come close by creating fear and discontent thereby legitimizing the environment in which they can operate (US, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009).

As mentioned earlier, an effective counter-insurgency tactics must primarily include military, political and social actions but under the strong control of a single authority. There is a consensus by experts, among who is D. Galula (1964, 54-56), regarding the *modus operandi* and premise that ought to be considered as guides in the execution of counter-insurgency. These would include:

- i. The aim of counter-insurgency is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory;
- ii. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict, support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active minority;
- iii. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution or reprisals from the insurgents; and

- iv. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, than gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area (Ogbeide, 321-333).

Counter-terrorism should entail not only the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and organization but also the permanent isolation of the terrorists from the citizenry. In the words of Galula (1964, 54-56):

In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grassroots. The counter-insurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.

Furthermore, Galula (1964, 54-56) itemized the processes of counter-insurgency in areas that are under the full control of insurgents; and these would include:

- i. Concentrating enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents;
- ii. Detach sufficient troops to the area to oppose the insurgents' comeback in strength, camp these troops in the hamlets, villages and towns where the population lives;
- iii. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off links with the guerrillas;
- iv. Destroy the local insurgent political organization;
- v. Set up by means of election, new provisional local authorities;
- vi. Testing those [new] authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the soft and incompetents, give full support to the active leaders and organize self-defense units;
- vii. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement; and
- viii. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.

Yet, these postulations have been found not to apply to all situations vis-à-vis the areas in which the terrorists are in full control or not. However, the essence of counter-insurgency warfare is the building or rebuilding the bartered political machinery of government and the confidence of the citizenry. Government's efforts must be proactive in seizing initiative from the insurgents. Similarly, R. Thompson (1966) has outlined four basic principles that would aid counter-insurgency, *videlicet* that:

- i. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable;
- ii. The government must function in accordance with the law;
- iii. The government must have an overall plan; and

iv. The government must give priority to defeating political subversion; not the guerrillas.

Regarding the guerrilla phase of insurgency when, for instance, Boko Haram moved to the Sambisa Forest, government was expected to have secured its base areas, in this case the Northeast of Nigeria, as a starting point for counter-insurgency. It did not to the extent that Boko Haram launched successful attacks from Sambisa Forest and captured about 75 percent of the communities in the Northeast geopolitical zone of Nigeria (Hassan A. Saliu and Saka Luqman, 2019: 9-11).

### **Dealing with Terrorism**

This section will be examined in two prongs, namely, dealing with terrorism and, second, Nigeria's war on the Boko Haram sect.

It must be borne in mind by governments and commentators that there is no quick fix of the problems caused by terrorism. Moreover, terrorism has been an old and worldwide system which has been motivated by differing reasons given to those already recruited and about to be recruited members. To compound counter-insurgency efforts, the terrorists are permanently on the move and everywhere. Three overlapping sub-tasks have been identified as possible approaches to dealing with terrorism, namely (Fotion, Kashnikov and Lekea, 2007: 154-159):

- i. Military measures that adequately show promises of being enough in dealing with terrorism;
- ii. Non-military measures that could be taken outside the nation's borders; and
- iii. Internal measures.

### **Military Measures**

Military measure entails specific goals, targets and actions since an outright declaration of war on terrorism will fail because terrorism changes its characteristics by growing and shrinking, and then popping up in new places. Thus, it becomes necessary to identify terrorist groups and hitting hard first on the strongest of them before turning attention to the next. Before celebrating victory after specific targets have been neutralized, preventive steps and overall actions ought to be taken to deal with possible sprouting of terrorists or their groups elsewhere.

The expected preventive steps would be the establishment of a good intelligence programme, considering the fact that the terrorists keep a "stealthy profile". There must be emphasis ground offensive, although electronic intelligence and aerial bombardments have proven useful. Regarding ground operations, the army must train their personnel to know the language and cultures of the terrorists. Requiring time and "ounces of silver", the government, at this time, might be accused of insensitivity towards the peoples plight and, seemingly, losing the battle against terrorism.

The military must also fight against the moral burden which terrorists deliberately create by the effective use of the media, and by the use of public relations campaign strategies which portray them as “helpless and innocent” victims of anti-terrorist campaigns. Consequently, the anti-terrorist public and the peoples of the terrorist communities would continue to perceive them as being right even when the terrorists have killed them in great numbers. This is, moreso, when it is glaring that the military and anti-terrorist constituency have lapsed into unbridled corruption and immorality and are termed “occupiers, exploiters, murderers and butchers of the people they claim to be protecting. Even when the military makes efforts, it will be assumed that it would have achieved more if the funds meant for anti-insurgency were not misdirected by the top brass of the military in connivance with government officials.

In the event of moral, undemocratic lapses, and ineptitude on the part of anti-terror operators, damage control or limitation policy which deals with the damages quickly and promptly must be adopted by the military or democratic States. This means that those found culpable in moral lapses and undemocratic practices are not only dealt with through apportioning blames but outrightly punished, in the case of the military, through court martial. There should be no preferential treatment or punishment to the top and/or the lower ranks. Concomitantly, there must be internal and external cross-border reviews of personnel whether high- or low-ranked; and these reviews must be credible without always punishing the lower-ranked military and civilian personnel.

The terrorists must be alienated from their communities or ethnic groups in order to prevent them from operating comfortably within their cultures, thereby, controlling what are taught in their religious institutions, local newspapers, in schools, markets and workplaces, at social gatherings and in everyday conversations. It has been difficult breaking into this ethnic-oriented web of terrorists. The military or democratic State must identify the lapses in the terrorist enclave for a counter public relations campaign. Such lapses could be arrogance or corruption. Two things could happen. First, less radical members of the terrorist community would lead a counter public relations campaign and, second, outsider public relations campaign would also suffice and enhance the terrorist alienation motive. For instance, in Chechnya, when the terrorists punished many of them for not supporting them, there was a backlash. However, the less radical members of the terrorist ethnic group might fall into disfavor with the people if they are not circumspect and openly associated with the outsider public relations effort. In the event of this, the bonding between the terrorists and their communities would become even tighter.

Another major scheme of alienating the terrorist would be to make security a priority and protect terrorist constituencies from attacks from all sides. This would be done through the establishment of zones of security that will be secured by the domestic police and military. This could be in the forms of Internally Displaced Persons’ camps (IDPs); and/or in small-

sized zones that would be expanded as time went on. This counter-insurgency strategy has always proven effective in small and medium sized communities.

In addition to the provision of security in the communities, a good employment programme could necessarily be instituted in the security zones in order to rehabilitate and normalize the peoples' lives. Yet, the employment programme must be closely tied to a strong public relations programme that will clearly show who is providing and guaranteeing the jobs, and that they can do it better than the terrorists who are known to have provided jobs for the people. In the aftermath of anti-terrorist campaigns by the military and in support of the quick-in and quick-out policy, there must be police presence in addition to the regular military force. The quick-in and quick-out policy is usually adopted so that the people do not begin to perceive the forces as 'occupiers' who might have concealed motive. These policies emphasize the limitation of military ventures which are aimed at doing specific jobs; and the outside forces made to retreat to remote but nearby corners of the area of battle, leaving the settling of political battles to the local authority (Fotion, Kashnikov and Lekea, 2007: 160-163).

### **Non-Military External Approaches to Dealing with Terrorism**

Among the non-military approaches are the introduction of Vocational Education and Training (VET) and diplomacy. Diplomacy must be used exhaustively before open confrontations especially between governments and sponsoring governments. Moreover, embarking on wars is not only expensive in fiscal terms, but wasteful in human resource. Therefore, diplomatic moves at conflict resolution are made towards States that have sympathy with the terrorists in order that they provide the leeway to fight terrorists.

Another non-military but related factor is cooperation. When contiguous and circumjacent nations cooperate, cross-border or the "new terrorism" which emphasizes mobility across borders will be curbed. Consequently, if terrorists are pursued or put into heat in one country, they can or are known to have easily moved across-borders to another to hide, recoup and re-launch; and/or use it as their new operational base, evenso, in this era of physical and electronic mobility.

The provision of jobs and employment must be consistent with making provisions for the resettlement of a displaced population. For instance, with good and lucrative employment, a hitherto restive population will experience relative peace and personal security. Although other commentators have argued that such a population would be empowered enough through training to be able to execute the provided jobs. In essence, government must be proactive enough, again, to provide sustained employment by renewing, continuously, job creation polices, so that unemployment will not re-emerge and trouble resurfacing. This is imperative in counter-terrorism since insurgents have remained mercurial and in the habit of returning to the places they invaded before.

### **Non-Military Internal Approaches to Dealing with Terrorism**

A major internal factor for dealing with terrorism is the provision of adequate security and its continuous upgrade in key government infrastructures. Yet, the provision of security has always depended on any nation's resources but must provide it, somehow, within its means.

Another internal factor is public education concerning terrorist events/actions and modalities. Whether these events are cruel, small or large-scaled, how have the news been presented to the public by the media and government? If the presentation makes the public to panic, then the terrorists' dream would have been realized while the government indirectly aided the terrorists' public relations campaigns intended on the public. Public education must be such that prepares the public regarding what to expect from a terrorist attack and are, therefore, forewarned against being unnecessarily panicky. This is of essence since terrorists react more aggressively if an already conducted terrorism does not relay their message to the public. Consequently, there is danger and often a backlash in educating the public on terrorist activities, while not educating them portends even a greater danger; making educating them a worthier risk on the long-run.

It is, however, imperative educating the public since terrorism cannot be wished away. It must happen, therefore, the public must equally be able to forecast it happening. Moreover, people should be taught not to overreact to terrorist attacks but learn to live with it vis-à-vis its prevalence and persistence in the world today. Instead what should be dreaded is 'tomorrow's terrorism' and its escalation since terrorists have began to acquire more sophisticated biological and nuclear weapons. In essence, military resources must be systematically monitored and even their points of manufacture (Louise Richardson, 2006: 232-233).

Terrorists must be prevented from acquiring deadlier weapons of mass destruction. Oil rich nations must guide against petrodollars that trickling into the coffers of terrorists for use. Some of the money made by Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, have been received by terrorist groups; and these nations have openly given support to terrorists, their enclaves, and in the provision of safe havens for them. Strategically, capital inflows to the nations that are sympathetic to terrorism could be cut through the conservation and provision of alternative energy strategies. This is evident in the declaration of Thomas Friedman (2007) when he said, "Lets exploit Iran's oil addiction by ending ours".

The Nigerian State is no stranger to group grievance, militancy or insurgency that adopts violence as instrument of negotiation; and these groups have, so far, been adjudged largely successful. A proper assessment of government's efforts on counter-terrorism, especially in the Northeast of Nigeria, would portray, until 2019, a disjointed State response. The Boko Haram insurgent group has withstood the Nigerian State for almost a decade and more than a 100, 000 deaths have been recorded since 2009. For instance, suicide bombings

have increased from 32 in 2014 to 151 in 2016. A worrisome trend, it was observed that in every five suicide attacks carried out in 2016 one was by a child (Okoye and Ezirim, 2018: 371-372).

Although Nigeria's efforts have been State-centric and military-inclined against terrorism, it, nonetheless, hastily contrived a Joint Task Force (JTF) which consisted, and still consists, of the Nigerian armed forces; a multilateral military arrangement in a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which comprised soldiers from the countries that form the Lake Chad Basin Commission, such as the Republics of Chad, Cameroun, Niger and Benin; and a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF): an inter-communally assembled local vigilante group that have successfully undertaken grassroots military operations against the Boko Haram sect.

The declaration of emergency in 2013 and the full mobilization of Nigeria's military assets to combat Boko Haram in the Northeast further exposed the teething problems militating against counter-insurgency. Among these have been, first, the faltering nature of the war against Boko Haram and the inability of Nigeria's joint security agencies to curtail its violent activities; and, second, these have had serious implications for the internal politics, governance and economic development of Nigeria. Concomitantly, these observable deficiencies in Nigeria's efforts have impacted negatively on her international rating and called to question her leadership status in West Africa and Africa, respectively. In the opinion of Saliu and Luqman (2019, 9-11) the lack of definitive successes against Boko Haram insurgency has undermined the nation's much touted successes in international peace-keeping assignments, questioned the professional capacity and competence of the Nigerian armed forces and constitute a blight on the intelligence gathering potential of the nation's security agencies.

However, a number of successes have been recorded in the Northeast. The insurgents have been dislodged from the Sambisa National Forest Reserve in Borno State and the liberation of other previously held territories. But abounding evidences have portrayed these successes as temporary especially since the Boko Haram insurgents have always rebounded, attacked and occupied new contiguous territories.

### **War on Boko Haram**

The Nigerian government commenced the war on Boko Haram by adopting the orthodox approach which entailed the full deployment of the military which included the armed forces, the mobile arm of the Nigerian Police force and other security/intelligence apparatuses. Later faulted, the orthodox method gained prominence after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States of America. Premised on the 'war model', terrorism was then considered as a military problem that must be tackled as such. Majorly, terrorists groups, their financiers and supporters/sponsors were, and still are, targeted.

Proponents of the war model advocate the direct invasion of the terrorist groups' enclaves by a State and the multinational armed forces created for the fight against terrorism.

Regarding, and within the context of, orthodox counter-terrorism strategy, military deployments have been termed reactive although it can be used as pre-emptive strike at the terrorist' enclave; and to disrupt its operational networks. Yet, the adoption of the orthodox war model strategy has proven to be the fastest approach in degrading terrorism and its groups' capacities; and conversely, to demonstrate the State's commitment and capacity to its citizenry, the international community and the media, of its readiness for counter-insurgency.

Before 2015, following the continued violent attacks by the Boko Haram group, non-orthodox approaches were adopted the Nigerian State-led President Goodluck Jonathan who on 12 June 2011 established a Joint Task Force code-named "Operation Restore Order". The JTF personnel were drawn from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Department of State Security (DSS) and the Nigerian Police Force and given the mandate to counter Boko Haram's violent attacks. It was also technically meant to prevent the duplication of efforts, pool resources together and enhance the free flow of strategic information between the segments of the security forces.

Since 2015, with the ascension to power of President Muhammadu Buhari, military onslaught against Boko Haram was redoubled. These were done through the relocation of the military headquarters coordinating counter-terrorism from Abuja to Maiduguri; changed security Chiefs and improved the welfare of personnel on the battlefield. The other seemingly non-orthodox strategy has been the inclusion in counter-terrorism effort of a Multinational Joint Task Force and a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (Saliu and Luqman, 2019: 12-14). Yet, the activities of government and the joint components in the counter-terrorism efforts have been inhibited by the obvious factors of:

#### **Poor Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination**

This factor was exacerbated by the lack of synergy and inter-agency rivalry. In as much as incidences of rivalry were to be expected between government Ministries, Departments and Agencies vis-à-vis the overlaps in functions and responsibilities, when acrimony became obvious in the relationships between security agencies, the task of securing the people and the nation was threatened especially in the fight against insurgency. Rivalry has remained become heightened as a result of some factors, namely:

- a. Decades of military dictatorship and the Army providing leadership in almost all facets of administration in government under military rule;
- b. Decades of neglect especially of the Nigerian Police Force after the demoralized psyche of personnel vis-à-vis provisioning that in turn caused envy against the Armed Forces taken together; and

- c. A sense of inferiority was consequently created between the Army and the Police. The Police seemingly made up through the taking of bribes and became disregarded or looked-down upon by the other security agencies and by the citizenry.

Several squabbles, indeed, street fights have taken place between members of the various security agencies over who should be responsible for specific duties in the maintenance of law and order; and the overall sovereignty of Nigeria. The maintenance of law and order are basic Police functions but decades of neglect since military rule has rendered the Police incapable of discharging its statutory role. The ineffectiveness of Nigeria's security agencies in executing counter-terrorism programmes stemmed from lack of cooperation and commitment among them, resulting to scores of Nigerians, inclusive of members of security agencies, having been killed and abducted by the Boko Haram terrorists. Thus, acrimonies between security agencies in Nigeria have prevented synthesizing operational efforts which, in turn, inversely affected the sharing of intelligence information. The poor pooling of resources, synchronization of efforts and intelligence information sharing have worked to undermine the collective realization of the objectives of protection of lives and property, public safety, protecting Nigeria's territorial integrity (Saliu and Luqman, 14-15). The management of Nigeria's security agencies constantly engages in open trading of blames and damaging accusations even in the media in order to score cheap political points.

### **Poor Culture of Inter-agency Intelligence Information Management**

This factor has affected the fight against terrorism in the areas of cooperation and coordination. This fight, at another level, has been affected by overlap of responsibilities, authorities and inter-agency acrimonies and squabbles prevalent in the area of intelligence gathering, information management, and security threats investigation and (required) responses. Statutorily, although there are several intelligence agencies, the Department of State Security (DSS) also known as State Security Services (SSS) which primary function is domestic intelligence gathering; Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA) which function is gathering intelligence information from outside the shores of Nigeria; and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which function is intra-military intelligence gathering and management, have been prominent.

Added to the mentioned statutory agencies are the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) which function is both domestic and military intelligence and was pervasive during military rule; the Federal Intelligence Bureau (of the Nigerian Police Force) which mandate is internal intelligence gathering and intelligence information management but was relegated to the background during military rule. With these agencies and their corresponding jurisdictions, the issue of overlap of responsibilities was unavoidable excepting, perhaps, the NIA which responsibility is external. These security agencies have tended to guard jealously their institutional independence, advantages and, therefore, have constituted bulwarks against oversight activities by other agencies.

Rehearsing the issues of cooperation and coordination further, three key problems have been categorized. These are, first, budgetary constraints and the issue of corruption in security spending; second, the issue of overlapping roles, authority and jurisdiction among security agencies; and, three, the culture of superiority-feeling especially by the military that since military rule perceived itself as the “ultimate guardian and guarantor of Nigeria’s security and sovereignty”. The army could be said to have contributed to the serious lack of cooperation, cohesion and oversight among the security intelligence agencies in Nigeria and that undermines their capacity to effectively harmonize efforts to combat Boko Haram and other security threats.

Absolute lack of cohesion and festering inter-agency rivalries are evidenced by the wrangling in the offices of the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the Chief of Defense Intelligence which were created by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, and charged with the synchronization of intelligence gathering and information management. For the first time, the problem of which office would oversight and provide coordinate operational activities seemed to be over. Yet, contextualized to counter-insurgency, it has been a problem as to which office the intelligence agencies would report to and relay information gathered from the field for sharing and utilization. The overlapping of roles would have accounted for the mistaken bombing of a refugee camp in Northeast Nigeria in January 2017 by the Nigerian Air force (Amnesty International, 2018 a: 282).

### **Poor Civil-Military Relations and Lack of Respect for Human Rights**

The many years of military rule cultivated airs of superiority in the army who rode around in armed convoys of military and police personnel carriers, had disdain for and routinely violated the rights of the civil populace; and even of the other security apparatuses, especially the police. It will be stating the obvious that this culture became transmuted to successive civilian regimes in post-military ruled Nigeria. This penchant alienated the military from the civil populace whose cooperation is crucial for successful internal security operations. During several military regimes, serious abuses of civilian communities, such as the cases of Odi (1999), Zaki Ibiam (2001), Odiomo (2005) and more recently the incidences of extra-judicial killings, in the context of countering militant and separatist groups from Boko Haram and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) to the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).

Additionally, numerous dastardly activities against civilians have been reported by Civil Rights Groups and the Amnesty International. These have caused the eroding of civilian trust even when the military are making efforts in counter-terror wars; and the efforts are regarded as their statutory responsibility even in the event of deaths. Conversely, there grew a psychological feeling within the rank and file of the army that they are not appreciated; and coupled with poor funding in terms of being ill-equipped, often abandoned their positions and fled (Amnesty International, 2018 a: 282).

### **Funding Constraints and Corruption in Defense Budgetary and Arms Procurement**

The army orchestrated misrule and the emasculation of the citizenry which manifested in the lack of professionalism, a dwindled ethics, value erosion and a neglected code of conduct within the Nigerian armed forces. Seemingly, there was the intentional starving of the armed forces of the state-of-the-art equipment needed for maintaining military operational readiness to check the excesses of the military. In the observation of Saliu and Luqman there have been slashing of funds which affected military training exercises and the upgrade and repairs of existing equipment.

The army has not fared better under the democratic dispensation since the Fourth Republic. There have not been turnaround maintenances or plans to re-equip the military for effective response in the discharge of its constitutional duties. The Boko Haram insurgency and counter-terror activities exposed these deficiencies; and instanced on the government of the necessity to appropriately fund the army so that it could procure needed hardware and munitions.

Available data have portrayed insignificant budgetary increases and allocations to the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Police from 2000 to 2009. Although spending on military matters increased appreciable from 2011 when it averaged about USD 1.7 billion up till 2014 (ICG, 2016). Furthermore, Nigeria's military expenditure increased from USD 1.62 billion in 2017 to USD 1.90 billion in 2018 (Trading Economics, 2019). A larger share of defense appropriation and what was released went into recurrent expenditures (payrolls and overheads), thereby, leaving less for equipment, kits, combat training and leadership capability building programmes.

The problems of the Nigerian military were and, still are, exacerbated by unbridled corruption. The procurement of military equipment, arms and ammunitions has been channeled through middlemen instead of from government to government. As a result, various equipment have been procured at inflated rates and the remains diverted into the private pockets of politicians and high ranking military officers and their accomplices within Nigeria and offshore. Repeated expenses, inappropriateness and duplications have been replete in military expenditures in Nigeria. The Presidential Committee set up by Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 to audit weapons and equipment procurement for the security agencies since 2007 uncovered a pot of sleaze. Most of the misdeeds perpetrated under President Goodluck Jonathan were traced to the office of the National Security Adviser, Colonel Sambo Dasuki. The Presidential Committee that was set up to investigate purchases reported that out of the 513 contracts which included the purchase of four Alpha jets, twelve military helicopters, bombs and ammunitions, awarded by Colonel Dasuki, 53 with the net value of about USD 2.1 billion were not delivered by the contractors.

The top brass of the Nigerian army, State Governors, Ministers and politicians were implicated in the heist. Among these scams was the money laundering scandal that was brought to public view was when the South African government seized two private planes carrying millions of dollars in cash in Johannesburg. Although it was said to have been money meant for the purchase of arms by the Nigerian government from private arms dealers (Saliu and Luqman, 16).

The persistent corruptive activities accounted for the inability of the Joint Task Force (Lafiya Dole) in confronting the better equipped Boko Haram insurgents. The military 'file' mutinied against the 'rank' who had become obsessed with corrupt practices. Presently (2019), although the situation has improved, Nigeria's security agencies deployed in active service in the Northeast have continued to face challenges of shortage of equipment, munitions and other essential gadgets for operations.

#### **Lack of Elite Consensus and Poor Inter-governmental Relations on Boko Haram**

There is obvious dissensus among Nigeria's elite, especially the political, on what constitutes the Boko Haram sect. These include their philosophical/ideological position, the reasons behind the group's mindless violence and what should constitute the manner of response by the State. The issues raised have occasioned the contrasting perspectives and views of Nigerians nexus the terror activities of Boko Haram. Rehearsing Olaniyan and Asueline (2014: 93):

Some Nigerians held the belief that the Boko Haram terrorist activities is a war by Muslims against the Christians; to some it is a sponsored conspiracy against the Muslim North while others see it as a war against the Presidency of former President Goodluck Jonathan.

Leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) are or have been convinced unequivocally that Boko Haram is a deliberate creation of the Muslims, indeed, an inquisition against Christian minorities in the North. Similarly, the ethno-regional and religious interpretations of the Boko Haram crisis by critical segments of the nation, especially by the Southerners have not helped matters and the war against insurgency. It was a concerted attempt, as popularly held by Southerners, to discredit the former President, Goodluck Jonathan, a non-Muslim and from the minority aspect of the South-south (Saliu and Luqman, 18).

The extent of divisiveness orchestrated in the churches and mosques is evidence of the lack of consensus. Insurgency and other forms of aggression, such as kidnapping, farmers/herders conflict and general insecurity have heightened and compounded by perceived moves at Fulanization and Islamization. These have tended to shroud the obvious lack of inter-governmental relations, cooperation and coordination. This was evidenced in

the activities of the Federal government under President Goodluck Jonathan and the Borno State government under Governor Kashim Shettima which did not take concrete actions at the time the Chibok girls were abducted.

### **Ransom Payment, Prisoners' Swap and the Rise of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)**

The negotiation and payment of ransom to Boko Haram insurgents affected counter-terrorism in the Northeast Nigeria since it was technically divisive and presented an unfocused approach in contradistinction to the orthodox military strategy of counter-insurgency. Although a lipservice, it is, indeed, a wrong policy direction to pay ransom and negotiate with terrorists; and at the same time claim to be fighting them. Some governments in the United States of America and Europe do not negotiate or pay ransom to terrorists. It is counterproductive to pay ransom and at the same time waste resources in military campaigns. The government could simply have paid ransoms and clear evidences abound of the Nigerian government having engaged in swap arrangements with Boko Haram for the release of those it abducted. The lure of ransom has fragmented the terrorist camps and, in turn, created further problems for government vis-à-vis the actual group it could negotiate with and for whom?

### **Integrated Conflict Management Approach to Combating Terrorism**

Seemingly specialist in execution and operations, terrorism does seem to be distinct from all other forms of aggression. Terrorism as a means to an end has obviously been duplicitous since it has been equally carried out by governments and non-State actors. It is even difficult to point at where the State and non-State terrorist activities divide, begin and end. Integrated conflict management is even made more difficult because some individual and groups' terrorist activities are clandestinely sponsored by State actors or governments.

The adoption of the Integrated Systems Approach has been a global strategy espoused by notable organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). However, most of the organizations have adopted this approach piecemeal as a result of lack in resource support; and in structural defects when it comes to comprehensively responding to conflict situations. The United Nations which is sponsored by the superpowers, such as United States and Russia has been a platform for power plays. There has often been lipservice support from any of the superpowers from which shores the dissidents sprout or are being sponsored by them.

In spite of the observable difficulties inherent in the Integrated Systems Approach which is based on the utilization of the problem-solving techniques, it is, however, intended to curb adversarial relationships worldwide. The System has been proposed at three levels referred to as the Integrative Conflict Management Circle, comprising:

- i. Conflict prevention and peace promotion;
- ii. Conflict control and abatement; and

iii. Conflict resolution.

These three levels of conflict management circle are, premeditatively, intended to eliminate the conditions that create an environment of conflict and discord within a common global system. It will also ensure that in the event of conflicts, it will be productively managed to prevent escalation into open violence; or to minimize the level of violence which could possibly translate into terrorism and war (Imobighe, 2006: 188-192).

Africa has provided a favourable platform for the festering of terrorism, given the prevalence of poverty in the midst of plenty; and with the unbridled mismanagement of its immense resources by its leaders and misgovernance in general. Africa, unarguably, is vulnerable in a world threatened by terrorism; and any well-articulated preventive measures that would make the continent relatively free from terrorist activities are unaffordable and out of her hands. Given its state of technological and industrial capacity, it is obvious that Africa cannot play any significant role in the fight against terrorism except, perhaps, South Africa and Egypt which can immediately manage emergency situations without resort to external military assistance and hardware.

In essence, African nations depend largely on the importation of military hardware from the international and willing partners in order to fight terrorism. The fact of external dependency has compounded Africa's problem especially in the virtual loss of control over their strategic and deployment activities. Additionally, African nations have incurred the wrath of terrorists "as a people dealing with their super (power) enemies, such as the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. Whichever way the relationships with the superpowers play out, African States will not, and have not, been better-off for it. It has become an economic drain-pipe on Africa's hard-earned foreign exchange. This is against the background that the military responses of the superpowers have been deterministic, by design or not, but by the need for pecuniary reasons that have boosted their home economies. This stimulant was easily noticeable during the two years of George Bush's administration. It has been suggested that (Eguavon, 2006: 188):

Since the net beneficiaries from the present war are the industrial nations with extensive military industrial complexes, it is in the best interest of African States to decouple themselves from what has become an indeterminate shapeless war and embrace the suggested integrated conflict management approach.

It is thought that African nations would spend less on the purchase of arms and save enough resources to govern themselves; and, perhaps, not seem as allies to the superpowers and continue incurring the wrath of terrorists.

### **The Security Economy of Defense and Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria, 2008 – 2014**

The spates of terrorism in northeast Nigeria pressured President Goodluck Jonathan in May 2013 into announcing an increased budgetary allocation for emergency military procurement of hardware and ammunitions. It was also expected to attract international security cooperation (R. Reeve, 2014: 5). Consequently, the total security vote shot up to N1.055 trillion including amounts allocated to all security agencies. A breakdown of allocations during this period showed that the Defense Department got N349 billion; Police formations – N311.1 billion; Police Affairs – N8.5 billion; Ministry of Interior - N156.1 billion; and Office of the National Security Adviser got N116.4 billion.

Rehearsing Eme and Anyadike's appraisal (Emeh and Anyadike, 2013: 24):

The total represents an addition of N135 billion [to the] N920 billion budgeted for 2012 ... for security gadgets. A further breakdown of the security budget shows that the Defense Headquarters is to spend N150 million on travelling and training. Nigerian Army is allocated N128.1 billion [with] N5.1 billion ... for overheads, N116.2 billion for personnel and N6.7 billion [for] capital costs.

Nigerian Navy has total allocation of N71.4 billion out of which N13 billion is for capital expenditure, N51.9 [for] personnel, N6.8 billion for overheads and N58.4 billion for recurrent expenditure.

The Airforce will spend N68.762 billion next year [2014] and N54.7 billion of it for personnel costs, N6.9 billion for overheads, and N7.1 billion will go for capital expenditure.

The Nigerian Army will spend N510 million on motor vehicle maintenance, N887.7 million [for] office and residential quarters' maintenance and a total of N2.1 billion on training and travels. N1 billion is allocated for procurement of various types of ammunition for the army while production of armoured personnel carriers will cost N350 million.

Elaborating further on proposals and budgetary allocations to the military and security agencies, Eme and Anyadike (2013: 25) continued that:

The Navy is proposing N10 billion to purchase ships, N1.973 billion on defense equipment and another N1.3 billion on training and travels; N90 million on generators. For the Air-force, N1.5 billion will be spent on travels and training, while rehabilitation and repairs of defense equipment got N3.7 billion. The Defense Missions has a total of N10.3 billion out of which N539.6 million will go

for purchase of secured communication equipment for the missions. The national Adviser's office has N1.034 billion as security votes, satellite communication in the FCT [Federal Capital Territory] will cost N6.782 billion, data signal centre - N9.8 billion, iridium/communication platform also in the FCT - N2 billion, motorized direction finder - 12 [pieces of] 4 X 4 jeeps [at] N178 million, cyber security [at] N142 million and Presidential communication network got N1.3 million.

Evidentially, therefore, the security sector has attracted huge funding as a result of spates of insecurity in Nigeria in virtually most of its geopolitical zones. The most intractable has been the Boko Haram threat in the Northeast and the Niger Delta militants in the South-south geopolitical zones; and banditry in the Middle Belt. There have been the issues of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB) in the Southeast geopolitical zone. Rehearsing President Jonathan on further proposals, Ilo and Chilaka restated that (<http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng>):

Counter-terrorism equipment would cost N3 billion while the Police was to spend N165 million on 3 armoured hilux cruiser vehicles and armoured Hilux for GSM tracking; N310 million is for patrol vehicles, special operational vehicles got N340 million, N455 million is for bullet vests and ballistic helmets. Also explosive disposals will gulp N250 million, dogs and handling equipment [at] N50 million, operational vehicles for Mobil Police – N150 million, mounted troops accessories – N50 million, automated finger print identification system – N70 million, forensic equipment and provision of DNA test and crime scene laboratories.

Reacting to the huge allocations to the security sector, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden, ranked Nigeria 57<sup>th</sup> in global rating on military expenditure and 6<sup>th</sup> highest spender on the military in Africa. In its Report (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List> of countries by military expenditures):

[Nigeria's] military spending competed with the expenditures of countries like Libya (\$2.9 billion), Morocco (\$3.4 billion), Angola (\$4.1 billion), South Africa (\$4.4 billion) and Algeria (\$9.3 billion). Countries with relatively lower expenditure among the top 10 spenders on military in Africa include Cote D'Ivoire (\$407 million), Namibia (\$407 million), Tunisia (\$709 billion), Kenya (\$798 million) and South Sudan (\$964 million).

Rehearsing the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Report further, Ilo and Chilaka contended that the allocations to the military may not have included wages and salaries but mainly for military hardware purchases which has been on the increase since 2006. In essence, the military budget would be bigger than shown. Recorded in the SIPRI Report (<http://news.naij.com/34638.html>) is that:

While government spent \$1.06 billion in 2006, by 2009 the expenditure rose to \$1.825 billion. In 2010, a huge sum of \$2.143 billion was spent in procuring military hardware, and the figure rose to a staggering \$2.386 billion in 2011. In 2012, the budget for security was the biggest, bigger than the allocation to education .... In 2013, the trend continued, as the allocation to Defense alone hit N668.54 billion, ahead of what was allocated to Education, Health, Works and other infrastructure-related sectors.

**Table I:** Budgetary Allocations to the Security/Defense Sector between 2008 and 2012; 2013 and 2014.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>President</b>
2008	N444.6 billion	Umar Yar'dua
2009	N233 billion	“
2010	N264 billion	“
2011	N348 billion	Goodluck Jonathan
2012	N921.91 billion	“
2013	N 1.055 trillion	“
2014	N340.332 billion	“

*Source:* <http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng>

From the above table, the astronomical rise in security votes to the military excepting 2014 was a consequence of rising insecurity in Nigeria. At another level, the tabulations have been done to show how allocations to the military have been abused by those entrusted with it in the fight against insurgency; and how the lives and property of Nigerians have been impacted on.

Speculations on widespread corruption among the operators of the security agencies were rife until 2015 at the commencement of the Presidency of Muhammadu Buhari when the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) swooped on the Security Chiefs and exposed their corrupt practices. The squandering of the huge allocations to security that were well-intentioned by, perhaps, the then Heads of State was reflective of the decay prevalent in the Nigerian schemas. The spates of corruptive activities would have accounted largely for the inability of Nigeria's armed forces in subduing the Boko Haram insurgency. In the words of Ilo and Chilaka (<http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng>; retrieved 20/03/22):

Over the years ... the armed forces [were] not sufficiently kitted with the state-of-the-art combat weapons to be able to decisively crush the uprising threatening the territorial integrity of Nigeria ... it appears that the more government spends on defense, the more insecure Nigerians feel. The heavy spending would ordinarily not attract public attention if this jumbo expenditure [had translated] to jumbo security ... in the Northeast.

The reality of abuses dawned on Nigerians when how the National Security Adviser, Colonel Sambo Dasuki, had awarded contracts to procure military hardware that were not supplied, was made open; and how Dasuki doled out huge sums of money to his principal's political cronies and politicians. This was common among the Service Chiefs of the other security agencies.

#### **Colonel Sambo Dasuki: Tough Task, Pros and Cons**

It has been the contention of analysts that retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki's background and social status would have constituted an albatross to the National Security Adviser's job given to him. To others, the NSA job was given to Dasuki in order to pacify the northern Nigeria's traditional and religious oligarchies.

In place of the usual military gun salutes that should have heralded Dasuki's appointment, the Boko Haram insurgents struck the same day at Goron Police Station and at a prison in Dala Local Government Area of Kano State. Attacked also was a Mobile Police formation in the Challawa area of Kano City. These attacks would have forewarned Dasuki of what to expect in the days ahead. As events unfolded, Sambo Dasuki was an obvious misconceived asset in the government's efforts in curbing the excesses of Boko Haram: a group which is believed to have the tacit support of some Northern elite who perceived Boko Haram insurgency as the Northern Nigeria version of the Niger Delta militancy.

Politically, other analysts regarded Dasuki's appointment as compensatory. It was seemingly a political compromise between President Goodluck Jonathan and those who were either piqued or opposed to his emergence as the Peoples Democratic Party's presidential flag bearer and consequently becoming the President of Nigeria. Particularly prominent in analysis was Garba Shehu, then a Media Consultant and presently (2020) a Press Secretary to President Muhammadu Buhari, who opined that in spite of Dasuki's royal background and social class, his appointment produced a converse result vis-à-vis fighting insurgency. Moreover, his appointment was intended to appease the Northern oligarchy. Shehu's contention was premised on the Kanuri Factor Theory. Explaining his position, Shehu (Adejuwon Soyinka, 2012: 19-22) adduced that:

- i. The Boko Haram terror movement is largely dominated by the Kanuri despite the recruitment of volunteers from outside Borno and Yobe States;

- ii. Those who appointed Sambo Dasuki ignored the historical rivalries between the Kanuri and the Northwest Nigeria or more directly, the Fulani hegemony;
- iii. This rivalry is traceable to the fact that the Old Borno Empire then made up of Borno and Yobe States, and some parts of the Republics of Niger, Cameroun and Chad, was not conquered by the Fulani jihadist movement; and
- iv. These areas, not only take pride in this historical fact, but also in the fact that they contacted Islam much earlier than the Hausa/Fulani currently occupying the area now known as the Northwest geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

Hypothetically, can a scion of the Fulani (northwest) royalty cultivate the trust and confidence of the (northeast) Fulani? Can a Fulani northern National Security Adviser conduct negotiations for disarmament with Boko Haram vis-à-vis these historical antecedents? In the words of Garba (Soyinka, 2012: 19-22):

Whatever theories may have [been] developed around Dasuki's appointment, the Kanuri factor and the appeasement policy should not be ignored. No confidence building strategy can succeed which ignores the undercurrents of historical rivalries between the Kanuri and the Hausa/Fulani of the North.

The appointment of a core-Fulani or, at best, a northwest Northern indigene could not have been as a result of the absence of credible retired and/or serving military officers. The cause of anti-terror would have been effectively served if, for instance, retired major-General Saleh Maina, former General Officer Commanding (GOC), Third Armoured Corps in Jos, and Major-General Babaganna Monguno, former Commander of Brigard of Guards, were considered for appointment into the office of the National Security Adviser. In Shehu's opinion, President Goodluck Jonathan's administration may have achieved its aim more effectively since terror groups are known to feel more comfortable negotiating with persons they can trust.

In spite of the obvious logic of Garba Shehu's contentions that could easily have been supported or towed by other commentators, Joseph Evah, Coordinator of the Ijaw National Congress (IYC) rather pursued a conspiracy theory trail. Evah said that Jonathan was ill-advised by some Northern power brokers in order to build a ring around him for the purpose of getting him out of office come 2015. Inferring from both contentions, Shehu's scheme simply reinforced Evah's conspiracy theory. Appoint a Kanuri for effective counter-terrorism efforts in the northeast while Jonathan retains his Presidential seat; or removing him forcefully as a President, perhaps, through a skewed election process. The various militant groups in the Niger Delta had threatened to stop crude oil production by blowing-up all installed pipelines in the region. Either way, Jonathan would still have lost the elections.

But the administration of President Jonathan perceived the removals and appointments differently. The removals of Andrew Azazi, then National Security Adviser and Haliru Bello, then Minister of Defense were due to strategic considerations. It was intended to change the tactics of the federal government in counter-insurgency and also for it to seem mercurial as much as Boko Haram. Moreover, the new hands would do things differently. It will be recalled that President Jonathan had mandated Sambo Dasuki to enforce stoppage of bombings before July 20, 2012 which was the probable beginning date of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

In a highly ethnicized polity as Nigeria, the backgrounds of these appointees counted much. Rehearsing Gabriel Ajayi, a retired Colonel and Intelligence Officer in the Nigerian Army, the issue of competence cannot arise between Azazi and Dasuki but only their ethnic origins. Azazi did his best as NSA but was only hampered by ... the Nigerian system [which] did not allow Azazi to function. Azazi had a constraint. He came from the same place with the President [Jonathan]. If he asserted so much they [would say] he is the President's brother. They would not be able to see Azazi as Azazi but as the President's brother. Where he comes from would always be a factor in an assessment of the man. Because of where he comes from, there would always be an element of distrust by some sections of the country. Comparatively, Dasuki could not easily have incurred the trust of members of Boko Haram or other personnel involved in the fight against Boko Haram. The Boko Haram people may find him a trustworthy person they can deal and discuss with. Trust is important in this kind of war which Dasuki could have brought to his office unlike Azazi, a non-Northerner, who the terrorists would mistrust.

Shehu's Kanuri factor and Evah's conspiracy theory pale into insignificance vis-à-vis that Dasuki is a northerner and would be preferred and tolerated by the Kanuri although a Fulani. Ajayi's stand played out when Dasuki visited Yobe State and met with the traditional and religious leaders alongside Governor Ibrahim Gaidam. In a post-meeting statement Dasuki (Soyinka, 22-24) said:

When I went to Potiskum, I told the Mai Fika (traditional ruler of the town) that as royal fathers, they must take it as a challenge to reach out to our people who are responsible for this crisis. If there is a feeling of lack of trust, they cannot distrust the rulers because [they] will not betray them and I will not betray the traditional rulers. I am committed to this cause and whatever the agreement is, that is what I will implement.

Gaidam described the appointment of Dasuki as a move to instance a new strategy in counter-terrorism. Yet, pandering to ethnic discontent, Gaidam said that the appointment is an indication that their hopes, pride and ethnicities were being taken into consideration.

Whatever the opinions that are rife, Kanurism, conspiracy theorems and clear-cut ones, the fact remained that for Dasuki to be successful, the supporters and financiers of terrorism in the North of Nigeria must be fished out and punished. For instance, the name of a former Borno State Governor and that of a serving Senator from 2015 till date keep popping up in the media but the federal government has been unsure of the possible links between these politicians and the insurgents. Moreover, can the sponsors of the Boko Haram sect be exposed? Can Dasuki do it or get the President to do it? The then Secretary to the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Jeremiah Useni, while hinting that Boko Haram was a creation of the political leadership in the North said that the insurgent group was taken as a child's play until it blossomed. It is the politicians who arm these youths because of politics and when elections are over what happens next? They are going to do something to fend for themselves.

The deposed Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim Dasuki (the father of Sambo Dasuki), other than speculations and logical contentions, opined that Emirs have been unable to intervene in solving the Boko Haram insurgency because the traditional rulers have, overtime, been undermined by the Governors. There has existed since democracy, rivalries between Emirs and Governors, in spite of the fact that the Governors appoint the Emirs. Sultan Dasuki said the Emirs are more influential than the Governors vis-à-vis the people; and foresees a reversal now that his son is the National Security Adviser. This seeming impasse raises some questions. Must the traditional rulers intervene before a solution? If the security situation in the North returns to normalcy, would it not then mean that the Northern leaders have always had real connection to the terror groups?

### **Ethnically-Premeditated Migrations**

Transhumance internally and from across borders especially from the northern to the southern parts of Nigeria; from the Sahel/Savanna to the grasslands; and to the tropical forests, in the search for greener pastures, is of antiquity. Other than transhumance, groups came in search of markets for their cattle. About four thousand cows are brought in daily from across Nigeria's northern borders; and are accompanied by herders who, over time, have increased in population. The immigrant herders who often returned to their places of origin have not been causes for worry.

It is also common knowledge that some Fulani from across Nigeria's northern borders were employed at the instance of Lieutenant Murtala Muhammad, by the Federal government of the Republic of Nigeria during the Biafra-Nigeria Civil War (1967-1970) as mercenaries and conducted the Asaba massacres precisely in 1968 (Charles Okeke Okoko, 2023). The ripples created by this fizzled out after the civil war. The mercenaries, unarguably, did not leave after the war but became circumscribed into the Northern Fulani population.

But recently, since 2015, the influx of the Fulani from across Nigeria's northern borders, especially from the Republics of Chad, Niger and Libya seem premeditated and worrisome.

These Fulani immigrants, coupled with the completion of the Katsina-Niger rail line, are readily welcomed into Nigeria with citizenship passports. Moreover, they have been registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of Nigeria as eligible voters having PVCs. It has been commented on in several quarters that this trend has been on since 2015 in order to have more voters in Northern Nigeria to boost the chances of the All Progressive Congress (APC) party in winning the 2015 general elections. They were also expected to become foot soldiers in the event of their losing the elections in order as stated “to make Nigeria ungovernable”.

Although having, unarguably, become Nigerian citizens, they did not and do not still have known sources of livelihood. Yet, most nomadic Fulani have been herders from infancy. But in Nigeria, and having no clear-cut agenda except, perhaps, when trouble brews, the Fulani so imported debuted as cattle rustlers, bandits and unknown herdsmen.

The lipservice tactics of the Federal government in tackling this brand of insurgency has left all in doubt about the sincerity of the Buhari-led government of Nigeria. Himself a Fulani, he has been labeled severally as their sponsor and/or patron. These imported Fulani herdsmen unlike the transhumance Hausa/Fulani herders who always held sticks, umbrellas and cutlasses, wield AK 47 rifles. They have not hesitated in unleashing mayhem on non-compliant communities. A typical terrorism, these attacks have ostensibly been compelled by being not given access to grazing lands but simply to cause fear and terror, and the consequent submission of the population.

From the utterances of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804 and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 1952 that the Muslims, therefore, the North will not rest on their oars until they dip their swords into the Atlantic Ocean, there have been fears of the Islamization of Nigeria. The importation of the Fulani of all colourations; and the frightening dimension of Fulanization has dissipated fears of Islamization. Seemingly a declaration of war, these, though traditional herders in disguise, are trained mercenaries who have operated where there are no strong bases of terrorist sects. The dimension of Fulani ascendancy is definitely widening. The Northern parts of Nigeria, the struggling Middle Belt of Nigeria; and the Southwest dominated by the Yoruba, have received inflictions from the “unknown herdsmen” who have always been unveiled as Fulani (Okoko, 2021).

## CONCLUSION

This paper painstakingly examined, conceptualized and defined counter-terrorism and/or insurgency, generally. It assessed the measures adopted in counter-terrorism which were military and non-military; and surveyed their application so far in Nigeria against, prominently, the Boko Haram sect.

The war against terrorism started since 2000; and successes and failures were recorded by government in the process. The successes and failures constituted the reasons for the writing of this paper which categorized them. It was found out that the failures were caused by poor inter-agency cooperation and coordination; poor culture of inter-agency intelligence information management; poor civil-military relations and lack of respect for human rights which the terrorists often capitalized on. There were also funding constraints in Defense budgetary processes and allocations; arms procurement underpinned by unbridled corruption; rise of splinter and newer sects, such as ISWAP; and poor integrated management approach to combating terrorism were all contributory to failures in the war against insurgency.

Recently disturbing is the assumed ethnically-premeditated immigration of hordes of Fulani from neighbouring countries, such as the Republics of Niger, Chad and Libya. These Fulani immigrants have caused the introduction of appellations, such as bandits, cattle rustlers and unknown herdsmen and gunmen. The counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria are definitely not successful so far. More needs to be done.

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