

Influence of Machiavellian Principles of Political Power, Religion and Development on Successive Regimes in Kenya, 1963-2007

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ABSTRACT: *This paper interrogates Kenyan politics through the lenses of Niccolo Machiavelli's ideas on political power. It analyses the relevance of Machiavelli's political ideas, as they have applied by different political leaders in Kenya. It pays special attention at how over the years Kenyan politicians at the helm of Kenyan political stage, the state house, have shrewdly mastered and used religion channelise politics of their times. Colonial rule in Kenya witnessed the emergence of a profoundly unbalanced institutional landscape and underdevelopment. With all capacity resided in a strong prefectural provincial administration, political parties remained underdeveloped making Kenyan politics to be leader centred. Politics is perceived as a game in which interests clash and political leaders attempt to establish stability amid conflicting interests. This reality is captured in the ideas of Machiavelli, whose works in political philosophy created the ideological ground for the emergence of Machiavellianism. The most significant aspect of colonialism in Kenya was political domination control, underdevelopment and authoritarianism. Colonialism in Kenya between 1895-1963 was characterized by economic exploitation and colonial expression. Sadly, the spectre of repression, exploitation and underdevelopment persisted in independent Kenya all against the hopes Kenyans had at independence. In this work, we argue that the post independence history of Kenya is replete with key aspects of Machiavelli's conception of political power, 'misuse' of religion by leaders and glaring underdevelopment all in the name of managing politics. Therefore, this paper examines the application of Machiavellian principles in the independent Kenya between 1963 and 2007.*

KEYWORDS: **Coalition, Colonialism, Coup, Development, Dictatorship, Regime, Religion and Power**

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INTRODUCTION

In the foundation story of the new nation, Kenyatta was a figure synonymous with the struggle, sacrifices, and sufferings endured for the sake of the liberation of Kenya. The attainment of Kenya's independence was without doubt a historic moment Kenya's new dispensation and its future was thrust upon a new leadership. On December 1963 while Kenya celebrated, its independence Kenyatta made many promises in Kenya. The expectations of many Kenyan africans was that they are out of the colonial administration that was discriminatory and segregative. The land alienation, forced labour, torture, displacement as well as disrespect of human rights were but a few of the issues that Kenyans expected that the African government under jomo kenyatta would bring to an end.

However the high expectations by many African leaders who did participate to fight together with Jomo Kenyatta, the examples of Paul Ngei, Kungu Karumba and the rest found no light because the leader they expected such from had turned into a dictator and an enemy of the freedom fighters. Additionally the second president Daniel Moi continued with the same style of dictatorship and tortured fellow African leaders. The third president Mwai Kibaki during his tenure led Kenyans into the post election violence of 2007/8 only to achieve the securing of power. Its from this point that this paper seeks to find out the influence of machiavellian principles of politics and power on political regimes in Kenya between 1963-2007.

Concept Evil and concentration of Political Power during Kenyatta's Regime, 1963 – 1978

Politics has always been a much talked about and debated subject and understandably so, many people have dedicated their lives to the study and critiquing of politics- Niccolo Machiavelli being one of the most important one of them whose works and theories continue to be relevant in the 21st century. In 'The Prince', Machiavelli proposes that immoral conduct, such as the use of treachery and the murder of innocents, was very normal and effective in politics. He also encouraged politicians to engage in evil when it would be necessary for political suitability. This work gained disrepute due to various claims that it teaches "evil recommendations to tyrants to help them maintain their power." Machiavelli argued that public and private morality had to be understood as two different things in order to rule well.⁴

As a result, a ruler must be concerned not only about reputation, but also must be willing to act ruthlessly when needed. Machiavelli believed that as a ruler, it was better to be widely feared than to be greatly loved. As per him, a loved ruler maintains authority by obligation while a feared leader rules by fear of 'punishment'. As a political theorist, Machiavelli emphasized the necessity of brute force or deceit to even exterminate entire noble families to head off any chance of a challenge to the prince's authority. Today, many governments and political organizations are

⁴ R. W. Grant *Hypocrisy and integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the ethics of politics*. (Chicago, 2008)

following the words and beliefs of Machiavelli. Both the interpretations of 'The Prince' are a part of extensive debate and discussions all over the world.⁵ Kenya has not been left behind in this discourse as the conduct of her post independence leaders are replete with Machiavellianism.

Machiavelli's view that acquiring a state and maintaining it requires evil means has been noted as the chief theme of the treatise. He has become infamous for this advice, so much so that the adjective Machiavellian would later on describe a type of politics that is "marked by cunning, duplicity, or bad faith".⁶The following are but a few of the Machiavellian principles in relation to politics and power; It is a very famous statement of Machiavelli which he justified for the "Reason of state". He assumed that state is highest form of human association. State is to be worshipped like a deity even by sacrificing the individual. A ruler must remember that whatever brings success and power is virtuous even cunningness, shrewdness is justified. Politics is the most precarious game. It can never be played in a decent and orderly manner. The state has some primary objectives and responsibilities like protection of life, maintenance of law and order and looking after wellbeing of its members. Hence state must have adequate means at its disposal.⁷

Machiavelli advised the prince he should imitate the qualities of fox and lion. The imitation of the fox (cunningness, foresight) will enable him to visualize his goal and means to achieve it. The imitation of the lion will give him necessary strength and force to achieve that goal. A fox might have shrewdness and foresight, but he is powerless without necessary force of a lion. Similarly a lion without shrewdness and prudence of a fox would be reckless. Hence a ruler who wants to be very successful must combine in himself the qualities of both fox and lion. He must possess bravery of lion and cunningness of fox, physical force is necessary when there is anarchy and indiscipline. But law and morality is essential to check selfishness of people and to generate civic virtues.⁸

One for the ruler and another for his subjects. He said morality is not necessary for the ruler. He is creator of law and morality hence prince is above the both. A ruler has primary duty of preserving the state. For this purpose he may use instruments of lie, conspiracy, killings and massacre etc. Because absolute morality is neither possible nor desirable in politics. He insisted that morality is essential for people. Only moral citizens willingly obey laws of the state and sacrifice their lives

⁵L. Heger, & I. Salehyan, Ruthless rulers: *Coalition size and the severity of civil conflict*. International Studies Quarterly, 51(2), 385-403. (2007).

⁶ Strauss, Leo; Cropsey, Joseph (2012-06-15). *History of Political Philosophy*. University of Chicago Press. p. 301. ISBN 9780226924717

⁷ M. Touré-Tillery, & A. Fishbach, The end justifies the means, but only in the middle. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 141(3), 570 (2012).

⁸D. V. Goff, The Lion, the Fox, and the Bat: The Animal Nature of Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Batman. In *Politics in Gotham* (pp. 107-121). (Cham, 2019).

for their nation. It cultivates civic sense and patriotic spirit. Thus Machiavelli prescribes double standard of morality.⁹

Machiavelli said that a 'good' Ruler must, for as long as it helps him to maintain power, practice generosity. The aim of generosity for a Ruler is to build a good reputation for himself. Being generous would include not having a tax system that takes away too much money from the citizens. If this happened, the citizens might be angry and begin working against him. The Ruler, however, must tax people enough so that he can get sufficient resources to dispense favours that would make the citizens depend on and feel safe with him. As much as possible, the Ruler must do those things that help him to be both loved and feared, Machiavelli said. Since being loved and being feared do not often go together, he advised Rulers to choose being feared instead of being loved.

Jomo Kenyatta was a Kenyan anti-colonial activist and politician who governed Kenya as its Prime Minister from 1963 to 1964 and then as its first President from 1964 to his death in 1978.¹⁰ Kenyatta as the President of Kenya chose to retain the main components of the Post-colonial Bureaucratic-executive State in Operation, recognising the strength of the bureaucratic-executive structure.¹¹ Kenyatta put in place a domineering network of the GEMA communities as a tool of control and domination. GEMA became a formidable force within the ruling party KANU between 1971 and 1976. This was an attempt to bring the kikuyu the Embu and Meru together under one umbrella of leadership and structure. This was a move to consolidate their social, cultural and economic advantage following the attainment of political independence in Kenya.¹²

The Jomo Kenyatta regime was a continuity of authoritative structures of government inherited from the colonial state. There were punitive policies of administration characterized by social inequality and exploitation. In his independence speech, Kenyatta did not suggest any substantial change in the colonial structure.¹³ Machiavelli's principles of power has played a significant role in the past in the post independent, and the current regimes in Kenya. Machiavelli describes how one should or could act to rise to power and to keep it. With freedom won, Kenyatta's government had to tackle the Mau Mau freedom fighters, who had fought the British and now came back to a life without jobs or land. For them the only tenable difference was that the overlords had changed; it was no longer the British lording over the country's wealth, but the nouveau riche. So, as the

⁹S. M., Zin, Ahmad, N., Ngah, N. E., Ismail, R., Abdullah, I. H. T., & Ibrahim, N. (2011). Effects of Machiavellianism on ingratiation in organizational settings. *Canadian Social Science*, 7(2), 183-190.

¹⁰Murray-Brown, Jeremy *Kenyatta*. (New York 1974),p.25

¹¹Gertzel, Cherry, *The Politics of Independent Kenya*. (London, 1970),p.76

¹² Amutabi, M.N, *Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya:Interrogating the Kenyatta,Moi and Kibaki regimes and implications,for democracy and developments Kenya Studies Review* Vol 1,No 1,2009,pp 55-84

¹³J. Kenyatta, *Suffering Without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation*,(Nairobi,1968),P.34

promise of land redistribution faded away, the president drew on the famed oath of warriors. This tribe-wide oath (sometimes forced) saw people swearing to always support him as their leader.¹⁴

Unfortunately as the founding father of the Kenyan nation, Jomo Kenyatta became the enemy of the nation, freedom and democracy. After independence, it was tragic that instead of Kenyatta creating democracy for Kenya, he terrorised Kenyans with dictatorship. Indeed, Kenyatta's government carted many into indefinite detention without trial in the same prisons of Kamiti, Manyani and Hola where Kenyatta and his comrades had been detained, tortured and killed by colonial tyrants in the name of white supremacy. The first shock at Kenyatta rule was when he abandoned the Mau Mau who had fought and died in his name and country and subjected his closest friends like Achieng Oneko to the same detention where he had languished under colonial tyranny. As a friend of detention, Kenyatta had become the worst enemy of freedom. This led to Odinga resigning from his post and quitting KANU in 1966 to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU). About 29 sitting members of parliament announced that they would resign from (KANU) and join Odinga in KPU. Mr. Odinga's party advocated for social and phonemic reform especially on the issue of land reforms and rights of workers as opposed to KANU'S support of the status quo.¹⁵

Many were arrested and held for long in prison e.g Mukaru Nagaga, Jaramogi Oginga odinga, Achieng Oneko, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, Koigi wa mwere, marre seroney, Martin Shikuku, George Anyona, Chelangat Mutai, Mark Mwithaga. All this was in agreement with the Machiavellian principle of autocratic ruler the only with actual power It is better to be feared than loved, if you cannot be both. Detention without trial was to reduce political opposition. The Kenyatta regime maintained the colonial structures of administration that is the provincial administration that was answerable to him. Worst of all, under detention, freedom was never a right. Once detained, a person never knew when his freedom would be given back. The President had authority to keep a detainee in prison forever. Worse, when in detention, courts could not be resorted to for freedom because they were themselves emasculated into kangaroo courts that could never release anyone that the President wanted in prison.

The Jomo Kenyatta regime was characterize by political assassination, perhaps the evil that Machiavelli advised the prince to embrace to remain in power. On 22 February 1965, Pio Gama Pinto was assassinated. Pinto was very vocal in furthering the Mau Mau Movement. He was also very vibrant in opposing Kenyatta's neo colonial land policies. In 1978, Kenyatta's death became the liberator of detainees, not because detainees wished Kenyatta dead, but because Kenyatta had

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Amutabi, M.N, *Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya: Interrogating the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes and implications for democracy and developments Kenya Studies Review Vol 1, No 1, 2009, pp 55-84*

made his death the only key that could open the doors of detention. Indeed the despair of detention had driven detainees to such low levels that many times they caught themselves unwillingly praying for the demise of detainers and tormentors whom they rightly believed had put them into detention to die from torture. Apart from detention, Kenyatta made himself an enemy of freedom by abandoning Kenyans in the desert when he died before he landed them in the Promised Land into which he secretly entered with his family and close friends.¹⁶

The assassination of Thomas Joseph Mboya in 1969 and that of Josiah Mwangi (JM) Kariuki in 1975 marked the beginning of a dark chapter in the country's history and heralded a chronology of murders. When Mboya, seen in his day as heir-apparent to the presidency, was felled by an assassin's bullet on Government Road, now Moi Avenue on July 5, 1969 the nation was gripped by shock. Then the decomposing body of the charismatic Kariuki was found in Ngong forest in 1975 and the news was received with disbelief and consternation by all those who knew the politician and what promise he held for this country. Since then, there have been other prominent murders, such as the killing on February 13, 1990 of Foreign Affairs minister Robert Ouko. Nearly half a century since the assassination of Mboya and Kariuki, a string of high-profile murder cases lie unresolved in court registries and in police files as poor investigations, lack of forensic technology and an apparent official conspiracy to cover up political murders continue to dog the country's criminal justice system.

Moi: The Religious Professor of Kenyan Politics, 1978 – 2002

Daniel Torotich Arap Moi rose to Kenya's political helm after the death of Kenya's first president on 22nd August 1978. Moi's rise to power faced overt opposition from the Kikuyu politicians who sought to install one of their own to succeed Kenyatta. Cunningly, like a fox, Moi endeared himself to the Kenyan masses and the larger Kikuyu community promising to follow the footsteps of his predecessor in what he termed 'developing the nation'.¹⁷

From the onset, Moi proved not only to have studied *The Prince* keenly but also to put into practice political lessons from this masterpiece. His political philosophy, *Nyayoism* (following the footsteps) borrowed heavily from the biblical teachings on peace, love and unity which became three pillars of his philosophy. Machiavelli advised that the prince must always appear to be truthful, merciful and religious, even if he must sometimes act in the opposite way. As advocated by Machiavelli, President Moi projected himself as merciful and religious leader whose actions were for the interest of those he led. As an act of mercy and perhaps forgiveness and to signal a new dawn, Moi started his presidential journey by realising all political prisoners who had been

¹⁶ Ibid, pp.85-86

¹⁷ Makokha Vincent Kinas et al, *The Role of Church in State and Public Affairs During the Moi era, 1978-2002. Journal of Philosophy, Culture and Religion* ISSN 2520-0445 (Online) Vol.1, Issue 1, pp 54 - 76, 2018

incarcerated by his predecessor. This saw the likes of Martin Shikuku, Jean Marie Serroney among others walk out the prison.

However, Moi's acts of mercy were short lived and he quickly adopted the character of a lion to survive the Kenyan political scene which was turning hostile and unpredictable. Machiavelli's advise that the prince should never over trust the masses dawned on Moi forcing him to become a "lion". On August 1982, there was an attempted coup against Moi staged mainly by members of the Kenya Air force. Senior private Hezekiah Ochuka allegedly led the coup. The coup attempt led to extensive loss of life and property with 900 air force and some army personnel arrested. Court martialled and given long jail sentences of up to 25 years for planning mutiny and treason. The trials period lasted up to four years. 12 soldiers were sentenced to death (pg. 238). His attitude hardened following a failed coup attempt in 1982. Moi embarked on constitutional amendments that were extreme compared to Kenyatta's. Moi usurped the functions of other institutions of the government to the extent that the concept of separation of powers had been rendered nugatory. Moi moved swiftly struck back by introducing section 2A, which changed Kenya from a de facto to a one party state making Kenya one party state by law (constitution of Kenya (Amendment) act No.7 of 1982). This amendment resulted in even greater restriction on political competition.

President Moi also clamped down hard on opponents within his party. Moi accused the then justice minister Charles Mugane Njonjo of betrayal. After legal proceedings, Njonjo was forced to resign for trying to force Moi from office. On 7 July 1990, police and the military violently broke up the first demonstration to call for a multi-party political system. More than 20 people were killed in what became known as the "Saba Saba" (Seven, Seven in Kiswahili) Day. When Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and George Anyona sought to register a socialist opposition party in 1982, Moi struck back by making the country a de jure one party state. He criminalized competitive politics and criticism of his leadership.

Despite all these obstacles, Moi booked a place in the annals of Kenya's history as the longest serving president of Kenya. Contemporary Political commentators and analyst have debated this and though they disagree on many things on what enabled Moi to remain president of Kenya for such long period of 24 years, they at least converge on one thing. That is, Moi ecclesiastical history and his close association with the church earned him some political capital though. It imperative to note here that there was open division between the mainstream churches and the Pentecostal churches when it came to supporting moi regime.

Mainline churches opposed Moi's dictatorial tendencies and even called for political reforms to restore democracy in Kenya. The Christian churches and individual clergy constituted tremendous pressure on President Moi and continued to preach against the high level political power monopoly by the ruling party, KANU, corruption in government, tribalism, nepotism and human rights abuses. It was at this point that a number of clergy from mainline Protestant denominations became

extremely vocal in their demands for multiparty elections in the early 1990s. Scholars have noted that it was individual Anglican and Presbyterian clergy who came together under the umbrella body of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) rather than individual churches that played significant roles in Kenyan politics during this time¹⁸.

On the other hand Evangelical and Pentecostal churches supported Moi because they viewed him as their own. In fact, some Evangelical churches like African Inland Church (AIC), to which Moi was a bona fide member and a staunch Christian who never skipped Sunday services, even withdrew their membership from the NCCCK primarily not just over the issue of political involvement, but also for opposing Moi's regime¹⁹. Ndegwa avers that the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches were co-opted by Moi to countercheck the opposition from mainline church clergy. Moi increasingly used Bishop Arthur Kitonga of the Redeemed Gospel Church to attract the support of the Pentecostals whom he used to counter the attacks from mainline clergy. For example, as Moi faced increased pressure to lift the ban he had imposed on opposition parties, he attended a Redeemed Gospel church service in which Bishop Kitonga delivered a forceful pro-Moi sermon. Evangelical and Pentecostal support for Moi can be explained variously.²⁰

In the Prince, Machiavelli identified religion as one of the powerful tools that the ruler could use to convince the masses of his benignity. Throughout his life as president Moi managed to curate for himself a public figure of a kind and faithful man. From Machiavelli's perspective every act is praiseworthy for the prince to keep faith and live uprightly at least in the eye of the public. True to this, when Moi died stories of Moi as a religious man were told. For instance, the Conference of Catholic Bishops (KCCB) while paying tribute to Moi described him as a leader committed to peace, love and a firm believer of God. On the same vein the presiding Bishop of African Inland Church Bishop Cyrus Yego averred that 'if Moi was not a teacher, politician he could have been a preacher'. This goes to show who Moi was to the Kenyan people. While it is not the place of this paper to judge the religiosity of president Moi, it is clear that his frequenting of Kabarak and AIC milimani on every Sunday portrayed him as a religious man who could be trusted by the masses. Using state broadcasting machinery, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) both radio and television, it was always reported where Moi went to church and the biblical verses that were read.²¹

Kibaki: The man of the People who never kept his political word, 2002 – 2013

In chapter 18 of the Prince, Machiavelli advised a leader to keep their words but also be quick to go against their own word when keeping the word would go against their interest. His work Machiavelli advocates for deception pointing out that a wise leader should never feel obligated to

¹⁸ H. Maupen, *The churches and the polls* Maupen, Kampala fountain publication, 2001

¹⁹ Ranger, T. *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008

²⁰ S. Ndegwa, *National dialogue in Kenya*

²¹ O.I, Julius Gathogo Mwai, 11/20/2022

honor their word since other people including other *pnices* (leadrs) can do the same. This is what has been since reffered toas the the “Un-Golden Rule” - do unto others as you can expect they will do unto you. This has been manifested in Kenya’s political history where laeders have seldomly kept their promises to their fellow leaders.

Mwai Kibaki, still nursing injuries from the motor vehicle accident and in a wheel chair, on 29 December 2002, was sworn in as the third President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kenya. At his inauguration, he stressed his opposition to government corruption, saying: "Government will no longer be run on the whims of individuals." Kibaki’s swearing in marked the end of four decades of KANU rule, the party having ruled Kenya since independence. Soon after electoral victory, the Summit was shunted aside. An assortment of the central figures of the Jomo Kenyatta regime – all of them Kikuyu – were reconstituted as Kibaki’s main advisers. This led to the reemergence of the so-called Mount Kenya Mafia that dominated the Kibaki presidency. Second, and a controllary to the above, was the dishonouring of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that had laid the basis for the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition and opposition unity.

In his first term, Kibaki as the head of a multi-ethnic coalition had the chance to heal the country's divisions, but the violence that followed the December 2007 election exposed the continued rifts. An estimated 1,200 people were killed and around 600,000 fled their homes as people were targeted for their ethnicity. The violence after the disputed 2007 poll led to the deaths of at least 1,200 people. Kibaki’s allies were accused of rigging the vote which, according to the official tally, saw him narrowly triumph over Raila Odinga. An independent investigation later found that both sides had participated in electoral malpractices and said it was impossible to determine who had really won.

Failure to honour the MoU led to Kibaki’s fallout with Key leaders such as Raila Amollo Odinga who had vigorously campaigned for him to rise to power. Failure by Kibaki to honour MoU could be viewed using Machiavelli’s political lenses as one may convincingly argue that Kibaki deceived Raila rise to power through the MoU.

Machiavellianism and Development in Kenya

According to Wasserman colonial rule in Kenya witnessed the emergence of a profoundly unbalanced institutional landscape. With all capacity resided in a strong prefectural provincial administration, political parties remained underdeveloped. The co-option of sympathetic African elites during the colonial twilight into the bureaucracy, the legislature and the private property-based economy meant that the allies of colonialism and representatives of transnational capital were able to reap the benefits of independence. In the late colonial period these elites not only

attained the means of production, they also assumed the political and institutional capacity to reproduce their dominance.²²

The post-colonial state must therefore be seen as a representation of the interests protected and promoted during the latter years of colonial rule. Under Jomo Kenyatta, the post-colonial state represented a 'pact-of-domination' between transnational capital, the elite and the executive. The ability of this coalition to reproduce itself over time lay in its capacity to demobilise popular forces, especially those elements of the nationalist movement that questioned both the social and economic cleavages of the post-colonial state.²³

Berman and Lonsdale observe that the colonial state in Africa as 'one of the most striking examples of bureaucratic authoritarianism'²⁴. It is true that the post-colonial Kenyan state shares many features with the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' states of Latin America. However, the Kenyan case, in common with many African states, differs from the Latin American model in several distinctive ways: the emergence of the state out of a nationalist movement that became institutionalised in a dominant political party; the position of the executive as a key source of legitimacy for the regime; and the extent to which issues of ethnicity and nationalism complicated issues of class.

While not unique, these features have had two profound consequences for Kenya. First, the ruling elite was forced to confront the widespread popular understanding of nationalism as a movement for self-determination. Second, to borrow from Weber, the strength and legitimacy of the executive and the capacity of the provincial administration meant that the Kenyan post-colonial state was bolstered by semblances of both 'rational-legal' and 'charismatic' authority²⁵. This proved to be a powerful combination and has underpinned the stability and longevity of the Kenyan state. The profound tension between the rhetoric of nationalism and the reality of social and economic domination were common to many post-colonial societies. The distinctive features of the Kenyan state lie in its ability to demobilise these forces through the primacy and strength of the executive and the provincial administration. For this reason it is argued that the Kenyan state is best thought of as a type of 'bureaucratic-executive' state that represents an important sub-set in the spectrum of 'centralised-bureaucratic' states.²⁶

²²Wasserman, G. *Politics of Decolonization: Kenya, Europeans and the Land Issue 1960-1965*, (Cambridge, 1976), p.23

²³ Ibid, 24

²⁴ Berman, B. and J. Lonsdale, 'Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State, 1895-1914', in B. Berman & J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, (Oxford, 1992)

²⁵ Weber, M. , *Politics as a Vocation*, (Philadelphia, 1965), p.

²⁶ Lindberg, S. "What Accountability Pressures Do Mps in Africa Face and How Do They Respond?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* (2010), pp. 117–142.

There is growing consensus that the underlying cause for Africa's underdevelopment is a crisis of governance, rather than the colonial heritage. Also for Kenya a lack of good governance is seen as one of the major causes of the slow pace of human development or even its decline, as in the 1980s and 1990s.²⁷ The Kenyan Human Development Index (HDI) - a composite of the indices of education attainment, life expectancy and standard of living – rose steadily between 1975 and 1990 but then started to decline up to now. The late 70s and early 80s saw not only a reasonable provision of basic services but also a quite good economic performance. The downward trend in the 90s was due to the non-growing economy, less access to basic services, corruption and an increased vulnerability of the population.²⁸

Corruption is named as the most prominent factor of the problem as it endangers the success of any economic reforms already from the roots. Also authoritarian government is a decisive covariable increasing the risks for development, as the political context already is a major obstacle for any project.²⁹ This is valid not only for economical projects but also for those aiming at improving the human rights situation and strengthening democracy. This effect became also visible in Kenya in various electoral situations. Instead of strengthening the democratic climate the ruling factions relied on stirring up tribal rivalries, bringing about more division, hostility and intolerance to their nations instead of political progress.³⁰

The corrupt and authoritarian rule also results in unfair distribution of the resources available inside the country as well as of those obtained from the international community. The ruling elites are mainly interested only to secure their position by bringing their followers into the state-service and also foster their private wealth. So the bureaucracy is extending tremendously and also the funds are channeled outside the countries to private accounts. Additionally many development projects are just designed to satisfy certain groups like tribes or regions, but are not really useful in the overall context of the country. This problem is more serious as the African economies in general are not growing and are also deeply in debt.³¹

²⁷ S. U. Alkire, Kanagaratnam and N. Suppa. "The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2019." . (Oxford, 2019), pp.34-35

²⁸ UNDP Report, 2019.

²⁹ Branch, Daniel. "Violence, decolonisation and the Cold War in Kenya's north-eastern province, 1963–1978". In Anderson, David M.; Rolandsen, Øystein H. (eds.). *Politics and Violence in Eastern Africa: The Struggles of Emerging States*. (London, 2017), pp. 104–119.

³⁰ Nyong'o, P. (2007). *A leap into the future: a vision for Kenya's socio-political and economic transformation*. African Books Collective.

³¹ *Ibid*,

Also by the mid-80s the majority of the African countries was whether ruled through military dictatorship or by one-party-systems that would not tolerate opposition groups at all or only to a very limited extent. This resulted in a very restricted field of possibilities for the powers of the civil society in Africa in general.³² Still there was a recent awakening of civil society in Africa as a response to the declining economic situation as well as the political decay on the continent, expressing itself in the decline of competitive party politics and the creation of patrimonial regimes.

The central objectives of this emerging civil society is economic and social issues as well as the struggle for civil liberties.³³ Majorly, Civil Society Organizations have a problem with raising enough funds to help in implementation of its agenda including promotion of transparency and accountability in developing countries like Kenya. These organizations need to be given opportunities to raise funds through managing businesses, donations from individuals and government so as to promote sustainable development and keep the government of the day on toes so as to promote a holistic approach towards inclusive development.³⁴ They need to have strong and tested governance and accountability mechanisms in place to help counter mismanagement and promote sustainable development from the local to the global perspective.

According to Lawrence and others, aspects of ethnicity-a product of machiavelian politics- have exacerbated inadequate participation by the people in the development affairs in Kenya. This has further promoted unequal distribution of resources, built resentment and created infrastructural inequalities within the country and the initial victims of the same have become the perpetrators of structural violence.³⁵ Furthermore, this has aggravated alienation of the members of different ethnic affiliations and has led to regional disparities in terms of distribution of resources, which have been further aggravated by negative ethnicity.³⁶ Participation in development spheres should be used as a force behind involving all people regardless of their ethnic group, social class, and religion amongst other parameters. This would in effect mitigate negative ethnicity with its resultant negative effect of ethnic tensions, horizontal and vertical inequalities for sustainable development in Kenya .

³² Lindberg, S, "What Accountability Pressures Do Mps in Africa Face and How Do They Respond?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* (Nairobi, 2010), pp. 117–142

³³ Transparency International Report of 2014.

³⁴ Lawrence, A. M. Revitalizing Civil Society Organizations In Kenya: An Assessment of Their Contribution To Achieving Sustainable Development Goals In Narok County. *European Journal of Social Studies. European Journal of Social Sciences Studies*(2020).

³⁵ Ibid,

³⁶ .(Kanyinga, *The Democracy and Political Participation: A review by AfriMAP, Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa and the Institute for Development Studies*,(Nairobi, 2014), pp 156-157

CONCLUSION

It is interesting to note that Machiavelli did not expect that a collectivity can be strong and well-organized enough to bring about a united state. He repeatedly argues that it needs a single will (and fortuna) to create a powerful entity that can successfully resist outside enemies and provide peace and order. This paper has demonstrated unequivocally how Machiavelli principles on political power have against the idea of freedom of expression and other civil liberties been applied by Kenyan presidents between 1963 and 2007. Biggest casualties have been the opposition leaders, the clergy and members of the civil service who at different times dared to challenge the 'prince' in their quest for democracy.

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